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In this article, we analyze the redistributive impact of a recent reform of tuition fees in Quebec. 
We adapt Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon's (2005) methodology to a Generalized Lorenz 
framework. Many policy analysts argued that maintaining low higher education tuition fees is 
regressive. We take a look at the empirical validity of this argument using data from Statistics 
Canada's Survey of Labor and Income Dynamics. We show the importance of using data to 
validate this argument. The results obtained allow for the conclusion that this redistributive 
argument is empirically not verified for the Province of Québec. 
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Résumé 
Dans cet article, nous analysons l'impact distributif d'une réforme récente des frais de scolarité 
au Québec. Nous adaptons la méthodologie de Duclos, Makdissi et Wodon (2005) à un cadre de 
courbes de Lorenz généralisées. Plusieurs analystes de politiques publiques arguent que le 
maintien de frais de scolarité faible pour les programmes d'éducation supérieure est une 
politique publique régressive. Nous analysons la validité empirique de cet argument en utilisant 
les données de l'Enquête sur la dynamique du travail et du revenu de Statistiques Canada. Nous 
démontrons l'importance d'effectuer une validation ce genre d'argument à l'aide de données 
empiriques. Les résultats obtenus nous permettent de conclure que cet argument distributif n'est 
pas valide pour la province de Québec. 
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1R´ esum´ e
Dans cet article, nous analysons l’impact distributif d’une r´ eforme
r´ ecente des frais de scolarit´ ea uQ u ´ ebec. Nous adaptons la m´ ethodologie
de Duclos, Makdissi et Wodon (2005) ` a un cadre de courbes de Lorenz
g´ en´ eralis´ ees. Plusieurs analystes de politiques publiques arguent que
le maintien de frais de scolarit´ e faible pour les programmes d’´ education
sup´ erieure est une politique publique r´ egressive. Nous analysons la va-
lidit´ e empirique de cet argument en utilisant les donn´ ees de l’Enquˆ ete
sur la dynamique du travail et du revenu de Statistiques Canada. Nous
d´ emontrons l’importance d’eﬀectuer une validation ce genre d’argument
` a l’aide de donn´ ees empiriques. Les r´ esultats obtenus nous permet-
tent de conclure que cet argument distributif n’est pas valide pour la
province de Qu´ ebec.
Mots-cl´ es et expressions: ´ Education sup´ erieure, frais de scolarit´ e,
in´ egalit´ e.
Classiﬁcation JEL: I22, I28, I38
Abstract
In this article, we analyze the redistributive impact of a recent
reform of tuition fees in Quebec. We adapt Duclos, Makdissi and
Wodon’s (2005) methodology to a Generalized Lorenz framework.
Many policy analysts argued that maintaining low higher education
tuition fees is regressive. We take a look at the empirical validity of
this argument using data from Statistics Canada’s Survey of Labor
and Income Dynamics. We show the importance of using data to val-
idate this argument. The results obtained allow for the conclusion
that this redistributive argument is empirically not veriﬁed for the
Province of Qu´ ebec.
Keywords: Higher Education, Tuition fees, Inequality
JEL Codes: I22, I28, I38
21 Introduction
Public spending on education has been considered a good vehicle of inequal-
ity reduction. However, the redistributive impact of this public spending
varies with the targeted level of education. Given that children from low in-
come families represent a larger share of the student body in primary schools,
spending in primary education is more progressive than spending on higher
education. In their paper, Moussaly-Sergieh and Vaillancourt (2007) go fur-
ther and argue that public spending on higher education in Qu´ ebec might
be regressive per se. The authors think that the poor are possibly paying
taxes to subsidize higher education of children from richer families. Despite
the logical nature of their argument, their inference is based on an illus-
trative theoretical example based on a two households society. Two major
studies use this illustrative theoretical example for policy recommendation
purposes. In fact, Lacroix and Trahan (2007) and Montmarquette, Facal and
Lachapelle (2008) argue that the provincial government should raise univer-
sity tuition fees. Without further evidence on the redistributive impact of
a tuition fees increase, this recommendation has been implemented by the
Liberal government with the support of the two opposition parties. Starting
September 2007, tuition fees increased by 100$ per year for ﬁve consecutive
years. However, despite the availability of data in Canada and the existence
of a large body of literature on income distribution, no study has tried to
assess the impact of this increase of tuition fees on inequality in the Province
of Qu´ ebec.
The objective of this paper is to ﬁll this gap in the literature in an attempt
to provide evidence on the real impact of this increase in university tuition
fees. To answer this question, we adapt Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon’s (2005)
framework to a Lorenz dominance approach (Atkinson, 1970 and Shorrocks,
31983). Using data from Statistics Canada’s Survey of Labor and Income
Dynamics 2002 (SLID), we show that, this policy reform increases inequality
in the Province of Qu´ ebec and that the illustrative argument in the above
mentioned studies is empirically not veriﬁed in the context of Qu´ ebec1.T h e
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the ana-
lytical framework. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis and the section
4 concludes.
2 Analytical framework






where y is the equivalent income2 and f(y) is the density of this equivalent
income deﬁned over [0,ymax]. For the purpose of this discussion we will focus
on social welfare indices that are inequality adverse. Formally, those indices
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where C2 is the set of continuous functions that are 2-time diﬀerentiable
over  +. The normative interpretation of the conditions in (2) is the fol-
lowing. The welfare indices weakly increase (u(1) 
yE
≥ 0) when a con-
sumer’s equivalent income increases. These indices are thus Paretian but
1See Atemnkeng Johannes, Akwi and Etoh Anzah (2006) for an opposite result in the
context of a developing country
2Following King (1983), assume that y be pre-reform real income assessed using pre-
reform prices as reference prices. In this context y is a money-metric indicator of welfare: in
King’s terminology, it is also called “equivalent” income. As noted by King, the concept of
equivalent income function is also used by McKenzie (1956), Samuelson (1974) and Varian
(1980).
4they also obey the well-known symmetry or anonymity axioms: interchang-
ing any two consumers’ incomes leaves the social welfare indices unchanged.
They also respect the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, which postulates
that a mean-preserving transfer of income from a higher-income consumer to
a lower-income consumer increases social welfare.
Comparing social welfare indices for two diﬀerent distributions can be







0 f(x)dx is the cumulative distribution of income. Consider
two distributions FA and FB, Shorrocks (1983) shows that social welfare is
higher in a distribution FA that in a distribution FB for all social welfare
indices U ∈ Ω2 if GLA(p) ≥ GLB(p) for all p ∈ [0,1].
The objective of this paper is not to compare two distributions of well-
being but to assess the impact of a public spending reform on well-being. In
this context, it is important to assess the impact of a reform on the initial
Generalized Lorenz Curve in order to compare pre and post reform social
welfare. This kind of comparison can be made by adapting Duclos et al.’s
(2005) framework to this Generalized Lorenz context. Let tHE (y)d e n o t e
the average monetary cost of higher education per student from a household
with income y. The proportion of the population at income y that beneﬁts
from higher education is given by τHE (y). A “targeting function” can then
be deﬁned as
φHE(y)=τHE(y) · f (y). (4)
ΦHE =
 a
0 φHE(y)dy ≤ 1 denotes the overall share of the population that
beneﬁts from higher education. The cumulative distribution function GHE(y)



















Assume that the government increases marginally by the same amount,
 tHE, the tuition fees of every higher education student. The expected
impact of this marginal reform for an individual with equivalent income y is
given by −g(y) tHE
3. It is then straightforward to asses the impact on the
Generalized Lorenz Curve:
 tHEGL(p)=− tHECHE(p), (8)
where CHE =
 F −1(p)
0 g(y)dy is the concentration curve of the number of
higher education students. The inspection of (8) indicates that the Gen-
eralized Lorenz Curves shifts downwards for a positive  tHE. This result
implies an unambiguous loss of welfare. However, this increase in tuition
fees increases government revenues and generates surpluses that can be allo-
cated elsewhere.
Let us suppose that the surpluses generated by the tuition fees increase
are allocated on tax reduction. Let us also assume that the government
marginally decreases taxes by an amount of − tIT on average. This tax
3By the envelope theorem, this is regardless of whether the agent changes his behavior
following the reform. This is because income here is a money-metric indictor of welfare
and not nominal income.
6reduction is allocated to individuals in proportion to their income. The actual
tax relief that an individual with income y enjoys is given by −(y/μy)· tIT,
where μy is the average income4. It is then straightforward to asses the
impact of this tax reduction on the Generalized Lorenz Curve:
 tITGL(p)=− tITL(p), (9)
where L(p)=( 1 /μ)·
 F −1(p)
0 ydy is the Lorenz curve of income. The inspection
of (9) indicates that the Generalized Lorenz Curves shifts upwards for any
negative  tIT. This result implies an unambiguous gain of welfare.
In order to assess the overall welfare change, we must compare the welfare
loss due to (8) to the gain due to (9). To do so, we assume that this reform
is performed in a balanced budget framework so that the reduction of public
funding in higher education is totally reallocated into tax reductions. Let us
denote by B the public budget. The impact of the above proposed program








Assuming budget neutrality, we have dB = 0, and we may deﬁne an economic





where TIT is the per capita tax. The numerator in (11) gives the cost in
government resources per dollar spend on higher education subsidies. The
denominator gives the same indicator for a tax relief.
Using revenue neutrality, (8) and (9), we get
dGL(p)=− tHETHE[CHE(p) − γL(p)]. (12)
4This assumption is consistent with the ﬁndings of Vermaeten, Gillespie and Vermaeten
(1994) who show that the overall tax incidence in Canada is proportional to income.
7This leads to the following result:
Proposition 1 The revenue-neutral higher education tuition fee reform will
reduce welfare for all welfare indices U ∈ Ω2 if
CHE(p) − γL(p) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ [0,1]. (13)
3A n a l y s i s o f Q u ´ ebec’s Reform
The Canadian context represents an interesting environment to study the
impact of tuition fees subsidies on social welfare. Although higher education
is subsidized everywhere in Canada, there is a lot of heterogeneity in tuition
fees on the provincial level. Table 1 gives some examples of tuition fees across
provinces. As we can see, the province of Qu´ ebec has the lowest tuition fees.
However, starting from September 2007, tuition fees increased by 100$ per
year for ﬁve consecutive years. The method presented in the previous section
enables us to analyze the impact of marginal reforms in general. Using the
envelope theorem, the analysis can be done using directly the information
contained in a household survey. However, it is important to note that, as
pointed out by Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999), non marginal changes in the
size of a public program may aﬀect the capture of the program by diﬀerent
socioeconomic groups. Assuming that higher tuition fees will change the
future relative representation of socioeconomic groups in the student body,
it is interesting to analyze the impact of a tuition fees reform in Canada as
aw h o l ea n di nQ u ´ ebec alone. This will give a hint on the expected changes
in the relative representation of socioeconomic groups in the student body.
To analyze the impact of the proposed reform in Qu´ ebec, we use the Sur-
vey of Labor and Income Dynamics (SLID) published by Statistics Canada







Table 1: Tuition fees 2006-2007.
attending higher education in the household. Although we do not have in-
formation on the program of study, we can still assess the redistributive
impact of the actual reform because, from equation (8), the only required
information is the proportion of person attending higher education at each
level of income.
To make the equivalent incomes comparable across geographical areas, we
use the implicit deﬂators developed in Makdissi and Groleau (2002). When
considering family composition and size, we use an equivalence scale to make
income comparable across heterogenous households. Let us denote by xi
total household income, we have yi = xi/ne with :
ne =[ na + ϕnc]
β , (14)
where ne is the number of equivalent adults in the household, na is the number
of adults in the household and nc is the number of children. The parameter
ϕ is used to diﬀerentiate the cost of a child compared to an adult. Cutler
and Katz (1992), who proposed this equivalence scale, indicate that there
exists a consensus that this parameter should be around 0.40. We use this
value. The parameter β represents the extent of economies of scale in larger
households. As it is frequently the case in the literature, we use β =0 .5.
Figure 1 shows the dominance test for Canada. Although the concen-
tration curve for the number of students initially is above the Lorenz curve,
9Figure 1
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both curves cross. This violate the dominance condition. It is therefore im-
possible to conclude unambiguously that the reform increases or decreases
social welfare5.
Figure 2 shows the dominance test for Qu´ ebec. In this case, the concentra-
tion curve for the number of students is everywhere above the Lorenz curve.
This means that, if we assume that there is no diﬀerence in the economic
cost of subsidizing tuition fees compared to the economic cost of lowering
taxes, then the reform adopted by the government of Qu´ ebec will reduce so-
cial welfare for all social welfare indices that have the property of inequality
aversion. It is impossible to build a social welfare index that increases with
the above mentioned reform.
At this point it is worth to try to understand what explains the diﬀerence
5It is however possible to assume that there is a subset of indices with high inequality
aversion for which this reform will be deemed as regressive by all indices in this subset.
See Makdissi and Mussard (2008).
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between the results obtained for Canada as a whole and those obtained for
the province of Qu´ ebec? Essentially, we may infer from the concentration
curve that the diﬀerence lies in the proportion of students that come from
lower income households. In Qu´ ebec, those students represent a higher share
of the student body. This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Paulsen and
St.John (2002) who show that the impact of a 1000$ increase of tuition fees
in the U.S.A. has 5 to 6 times more impact on higher education attendance of
lower class students than on students from the highest socioeconomic class.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this article, we have analyzed the impact of a recent tuition fees reform
on social welfare in the province of Qu´ ebec. Adapting Duclos et al.’s (2005)
methodology to the Generalized Lorenz framework, we conclude that the
11redistributive argument that was laid down to justify the reform is empirically
invalid in the speciﬁc context of Qu´ ebec. The empirical validity of such an
argument is essentially linked to the structure of the household data and can
be answered only empirically.
Further research is needer to understand the redistributive impact of non
marginal changes in tuition fees as well as in other aspects of student ﬁnancial
aid, such as scholarships, bursaries and student loans.
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